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SUBJECT: KHARTOUM TIGHTENS GRIP ON AU AND UNSC OVER HYBRID

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¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The extent of the influence of Sudan's Government of National Unity (GNU) over the hybrid draft resolution was apparent during July 13 meetings at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in which African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Konare participated. In a private meeting with Ambassador Khalilzad prior to the UNSC session, Konare urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur and to create a new environment of trust. He said compromise was needed on the draft text to allay GNU "apprehensions" about mentioning Chapter VII and UNSCR 1706. Konare warned that these references in any draft would result in an impasse on adopting the text. In the follow-on "informal dialogue" between Konare and the full Council, South Africa, Congo, Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China all railed against the draft text against the draft text, insisting that it focus only on mandating the hybrid; Qatari Permanent Representative (PR) al-Nasser went so far as to say the draft should be "completely re-worked," a statement suggesting Qatar might repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations on the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating a competing text (reftel). This intense pressure proved too much for Ghana, which announced it would no longer co-sponsor the resolution. No further Experts Meetings on the draft text have been scheduled. Ambassador Khalilzad will have separate meetings on July 16 with Joint Special Representative Rodolphe Adada and Sudanese PR Abdalmahmood Abdalhaleem. END SUMMARY.

KONARE ARTICULATES KHARTOUM'S DEMANDS ON DRAFT RESOLUTION

¶2. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad met on July 13 with AU Commission Chairperson Konare, who was accompanied by AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit, AU Mission PR Lila Ratsfandrihamana and Special Assistant Abdoul Kader Toure. Ambassador Khalilzad pushed Konare for his support on the hybrid draft resolution, specifically asking him to agree to proceed as quickly as possible, to specify a single UN chain of command (with strategic directives coming from the AU and the UN but operational instructions coming only from the UN) and to mandate the force under Chapter VII. Ambassador Khalilzad sought clarification from Konare on the

deployment of two additional battalions for Heavy Support Package force protection and on African troop generation for the hybrid. Ambassador Khalilzad emphasized that the USG harbored no ill will toward the GNU and wanted to work constructively on the problem of Darfur, which both the USG and the GNU had a mutual interest in solving.

¶13. (SBU) Konare expressed appreciation for Ambassador Khalilzad's message, as well as for the reception he had received in Washington on July 11. On timelines, Konare stressed the need for all to move quickly on the hybrid, especially the UN which he commented "was not easy to work with" (NOTE: The UN levels the same charge against the AU. END NOTE). Konare agreed with Ambassador Khalilzad on the necessity for unity of command and control for the hybrid and said that specifying this in the resolution would not be a problem. In agreeing with these two points, however, Konare urged the USG to recognize GNU efforts on Darfur without writing the GNU a "blank check" absolving it from any responsibility for the security situation on the ground, and to create a new environment of trust with Khartoum.

¶14. (SBU) To achieve this trust, Konare said the UNSC must consider Sudan's "apprehensions" on the draft resolution, which, according to Konare, were three-fold. First, the resolution should take into account the "clarifications" made on the hybrid during June 11-12 AU-UN-GNU technical discussions in Addis Ababa (NOTE: Konare did not specify what these clarifications were when asked by Ambassador Khalilzad. END NOTE). Second, the resolution should avoid reference to Chapter VII, which Konare called politically important for the USG but just as sensitive for the GNU. Ambassador Khalilzad pointed out the philosophical divide among Members on this issue and stressed that the debate was not Sudan-specific. Ambassador Khalilzad warned that it would be difficult for us to be flexible on this point, given the need to justify to Congress a peacekeeping operation of the

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hybrid's size and cost. UKUN later reported to Poloff that Djinnit told the UK he did not expect Chapter VII to ultimately be a show-stopper on the draft. Finally, the GNU wanted deleted mention of resolutions not accepted by Khartoum; i.e., UNSCR 1706. Konare emphasized that both the AU and the GNU were anxious for the UNSC to adopt the hybrid resolution as soon as possible and warned that failing to consider Khartoum's concerns would result in an impasse on adoption of the text.

¶15. (SBU) Ambassador Khalilzad solicited Konare's assistance in maintaining African ownership of the draft resolution, mentioning the fact that Ghana was under pressure from unknown sources to abandon its co-sponsorship (NOTE: Ghana announced in subsequent Council consultations that on instructions from Accra, it could no longer co-sponsor the draft. END NOTE). Konare agreed that AU leadership was "fundamental" and said he would meet with African UNSC Members to try to reach agreement on a position. Konare said Ghana would be perceived as being controlled by the UK if it maintained its co-sponsorship while divisions in positions with other African Council Members persisted. "If the Africans aren't united," Konare warned, "then it's good for Sudan."

KHARTOUM'S COUNCIL ALLIES DID ITS BIDDING

¶16. (SBU) In a subsequent meeting with the full Council, Chairperson Konare called for the speedy adoption of the hybrid draft resolution, for the acceleration of hybrid deadlines and for the consolidation of "burgeoning trust" with the GNU, reiterating the need to assure the GNU the Council had no hidden agenda and that the Addis Ababa "clarifications" must be incorporated into the text. He expressed hope that the resolution would be adopted by consensus. Khartoum's Council allies (South Africa, Congo, Russia, Indonesia, Qatar and China) then took turns railing

against the draft text, insisting that it focus solely on mandating the hybrid. South African PR Kumalo charged that the draft should reflect the mandate provided by the AU PSC in its June 22 communiqu and not try to be an "omnibus resolution" as he said the current draft attempts. He warned against refining issues like command and control in the text, debate which would serve only to bog down Experts' discussions, delay adoption until August and risk a non-consensus decision.

¶7. (SBU) The representatives of Congo, Russia and Indonesia agreed with Kumalo that the draft resolution should avoid addressing issues other than simply authorizing the hybrid operation, which Congolese PR Gayama added should be under Chapter VIII and based on the June 11-12 agreements and the November 16 Addis Ababa conclusions. Russian Deputy PR Dolgov advised that the resolution focus on providing a "reasonable, feasible and effective" mandate and on sending a positive signal to Darfur parties to support the political process and implement the AU-UN roadmap. Dolgov warned against the Council's creating "complexities we might regret." The Indonesian delegate suggested deferring other Darfur concerns to a subsequent resolution and to focus in this one on empowering the GNU to deal with its Darfur problem.

¶8. (SBU) More ominous comments came from Qatari PR al-Nasser, who went so far as to say the draft needed to be "completely re-worked" in line with the AU PSC June 22 communiqu and under Chapter VIII (COMMENT: This statement suggested Qatar might repeat the tactic it employed during April negotiations on the UNMIS mandate renewal resolution of floating its own competing text to mandate this force, as it did during reftel negotiations. END COMMENT). Al-Nasser also said the draft should not put Darfur rebels on the same level as the GNU, "humiliate Sudan" by threatening sanctions without a recommendation from the Panel of Experts or in any way discredit the GNU with which it should instead be seeking to build confidence. He thought a Chapter VIII reference would be the appropriate vehicle for launching a regional solution to the Darfur issue. Chinese PR and current UNSC President Wang called the draft resolution "a big disappointment" that failed to reflect the current momentum generated with the GNU

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on resolving the Darfur issue. He warned Members against behaving like "spoilers."

STRONG EUROPEAN INTERVENTIONS

¶9. (SBU) Belgian PR Verbeke and Slovakian PR Burian made strong interventions in support of the draft resolution, stressing the need for unity of command and control and the need for sufficient mandate clarity to allow the hybrid to adequately address the situation on the ground. Burian called on the GNU to contribute to this climate of confidence-building by removing obstacles to hybrid deployment. French PR de La Sabliere agreed with the point that the hybrid force must be effective in protecting civilians and argued that the resolution must consider the "comprehensive policy" regarding Sudan. He spoke to the need for a consensus text. Arguing in favor of retaining the Chapter VII reference and language on clear command and control, UK Deputy PR Pierce stressed that the hybrid must be based on "sound peacekeeping principles" to avoid failure on the ground, and she shared de La Sabliere's view that the resolution take into account all aspects of the Darfur situation.

SOMALIA

¶10. (SBU) Belgium, France and Italy pressed Konare for details on how the AU PSC would likely proceed when AMISOM's mandate expired at the end of August. Italian PR Spatafora criticized the AU for failing to full deploy AMISOM forces, commenting, "A lot was promised, but so far all we see are

two battalions of Ugandans. Before the Council takes up this issue again, we need to start looking at what has gone wrong and how we can get AMISOM to stand up." Konare did not comment on whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM's mandate, but said that AMISOM had been prevented from fully deploying by the lack of logistical and technical support from UN Member States. (COMMENT: While Konare clearly did not want to speculate on whether the AU PSC would renew AMISOM's mandate, Ghanaian and South African colleagues have told Poloff that the AU PSC may decide to give AMISOM a three-month renewal as a means of pressuring the UNSC to take stronger action on Somalia. END COMMENT.)

COMMENT

¶11. (SBU) Khartoum has clearly been doing its legwork in rallying support against the hybrid draft resolution. As of now, UKUN has not proposed a new date for Experts Meetings on the text to resume. Ambassador Khalilzad will meet with the Sudanese PR on July 16 to address GNU problems with the text, and this type of outreach will undoubtedly be required on a sustained basis to counter the Council bloc Khartoum has built in support of its position. It will also require significant outreach with African Council Members to get Ghana back on board as a co-sponsor. Without the AU President endorsing the AU-UN hybrid resolution, we face a real credibility crisis that could be easily exploited by one of Khartoum's friends on the Council only too eager to step in; at this point, Qatar seems the likely candidate. END COMMENT.

KHALILZAD